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Finance versus democracy? 




What should be the place of finance in social theory? What is the relationship between finance 
and democracy? The article identifies four major frameworks that analyse finance: orthodox, 
drawing on Adam Smith; political economy, drawing on Marx; heterodox, drawing on Keynes 
and Minsky; and societal, drawing on Polanyi. These frameworks are critically analysed along five 
dimensions: the conceptualization of finance; the relations between finance and the economy; the 
relations between finance and the state; the relations between finance and society; and the nature 
of the social system. A new framework for the analysis of finance in society is constructed from 
these elements. This is used to analyse the relations between finance and democracy and the 
prospects for the regulation of finance.
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Introduction
The crisis in finance is leading to ever deeper repercussions in economy and society. But 
how is finance to be understood? While some suggest social science did not see the com-
ing crisis, this is not true. Rather, most of those who did had been marginalized. It is 
important to excavate these analyses and critically examine them to build a more devel-
oped approach.
Finance has diverse implications for work, employment and society: financial insta-
bility generates unemployment through economic recessions (Appelbaum, 2011); the 
rise of shareholder value leads firms to reduce the conditions of workers (Clark, 2009; 
O’Reilly et al., 2011); financial interests drive the political project of neoliberalism that 
seeks to marketize, financialize and de-democratize public services (Harvey, 2011). 
According to Haldane at the Bank of England, the crisis reduced world output in 2009 by 
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around 6.5 per cent ($4t) and in the UK by around 10 per cent (£140b). If the losses per-
sist, then the loss in output rises to between $60t and $200t for the world economy and 
between £1.8t and £7.4t for the UK (between one and five times annual GDP) (Haldane, 
2010: 3). The uneven distribution of these costs by class and gender relations has been 
exacerbated by policy responses. In the 2010 Budget in the UK, the House of Commons 
Library (2010) reported that, of £8.1b net personal tax increases/benefit cuts, £5.8b 
(72%) was to be borne by women and £2.2b (28%) by men. Finance has become larger 
than the productive economy and is challenging democracy.
There are four main types of framework of analysis. First, orthodox, which draws on 
Smith and treats finance as a neutral medium within a self-correcting market. Second, 
political economy, which draws on Marx, analyses finance within the development of 
regimes of capital accumulation. Third, heterodox, drawing on Keynes and Minsky, which 
treats finance as a distinctive part of the economy, the expansion of which causes instabil-
ity in the rest of the economy, but could potentially be regulated by the state. Fourth, 
Polanyian, which considers the excessive marketization of money to be a consequence of 
the failure to regulate finance, which can be remedied by a democratic response.
A model of the relations between finance and society needs to address five issues: the 
conceptualization of finance as an object or social relationship; the relationship between 
finance and the economy; the relationship between finance and the state; the relationship 
between finance and society; and the nature of the social system as a whole.
Finance should be analysed within a theory of society as well as of economy. Finance 
is not reducible to the economy, nor is it neutral in its workings. Keynes, Schumpeter and 
Minsky were correct in their criticism of the equilibrium nature of the orthodox econom-
ics that rests on Smith, Hayek and Friedman. But they underestimated the extent to which 
the social relations of finance were embedded in wider systems of power, contributions 
of the political economy and Polanyi-led schools. There is a specific question as to 
whether democratic forces can regulate finance in the wider social interest, or whether 
finance has defeated democracy.
The article starts by discussing the definition of finance; proceeds to critically assess 
the four major frameworks; constructs a new framework for analysis of finance; and then 
analyses the relationship between finance and society.
What is finance?
The definition of finance is contested. One issue concerns whether finance, or money, is 
an object or is a set of social relations. A second concerns the range of activities that are 
included within finance, which is linked to the conceptualization of financialization and 
financial crisis. A third issue concerns the nature of the relevant social relations, which 
may include not only class but also gender.
The first issue is whether money is an object or a social relationship. The conventional 
understanding of money is as a thing, object, or commodity; while an alternative approach 
treats money as a social relationship. The traditional approach to finance considers that 
financial activities distribute capital to places where it can be used most effectively 
(Krippner, 2011). This approach is the application of ‘efficient markets’ theory to finance 
(Friedman, 2002 [1962]). Banks take deposits from savers and make loans as investments 
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in firms. The banks lend more than they receive, the ratio between bank capital and loans 
constitutes the leverage that contributes to their profits. Finance companies redistribute 
risk through insurance to where it can be borne with greatest resilience.
By contrast the treatment of money as a social relationship rejects the assumption of 
efficient markets and replaces it by one of unstable institutionalized competition. In this 
view, money is a promise to pay; a claim rather than an object. Money connects the pre-
sent to the future through such a claim (Keynes, 1936; Mellor, 2010; Minsky, 2008 
[1986]). Ingham (2001, 2004) develops this further, locating the social relations of money/
finance at the centre of the power struggles in modern capitalism. The key social relations 
are between those who produce money – institutions such as banks and ministries of 
finance – and those who produce commodities, goods, capital and labour. There is a ten-
sion between the producers of money and the producers of goods as each maneouvres for 
advantage in the possession of value. At stake is not only the distribution of value, but also 
the stability of the financial system which is vulnerable during this contest. 
Agents attempt to monetize their market power either by bidding up prices in money of account 
or by the expansion of value through borrowing and the creation of money. [...] This trade off 
and tension between the expansion of value through the elasticity of supply of credit-money 
supply and the breakdown of monetary stability is arguably the central dynamic of the modern 
capitalist system. (Ingham, 2001: 318–19)
The conceptualization of money as a social relationship enables a more effective anal-
ysis of the relations between finance and society that includes relevant institutions and 
dynamics, than does the conceptualization of money as an object that draws on mislead-
ing abstracted fictions of perfect markets.
The second issue concerns the range of activities that are included within the notion 
of finance, potentially including: money; speculation in currency, assets and risk; tax 
avoidance/evasion; investment in firms; corporate financialization; and individual 
investment products. The more narrowly finance is defined, the less significant it appears 
to be for society; the wider, the more important. The processes of financialization and 
financial crisis link finance and society. ‘Financialization’ refers to the increased signifi-
cance of finance in the economy and society in both scale and depth. ‘Financial crises’ 
are a form of instability generated by finance that has consequences for society.
Financial markets have extended the range and scale of the financial products in 
which they trade, from currencies and stocks to complex financial derivatives. Increasing 
amounts of financial activity involve speculation in the future prices of currencies, assets 
(not only stocks and shares, but also property, oil, food and other commodities) and their 
future prices. Developments in derivatives, futures markets, collateralized debt obliga-
tions, credit default swaps and securitization attempt to price and sell ‘risk’ (Epstein, 
2005; Krippner, 2011; Krugman, 2008; MacKenzie, 2006). Finance grew larger than the 
productive part of the economy in some countries, including the UK, where ‘debt’ rose 
to around five times the size of GDP in 2007 (Turner, 2009: 18). These practices generate 
considerable profits, but little additional production. Turner, Chair of the UK Financial 
Services Authority, famously described much finance as ‘socially useless’ activity 
(Turner, 2010).
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Tax is not conventionally regarded as part of finance. However, it should be, since 
the development of complex financial arrangements to avoid, evade or dodge tax is a 
significant part of contemporary financial activity. This involves the use of tax havens 
(secrecy jurisdictions) as well as the movement of funds between different tax regimes 
to take advantage of lower rates of taxation. Tax avoidance is legal and evasion is not, 
though the location of the boundary is often disputed. Finance companies not only 
search for loopholes in the law to provide tax dodging services to rich clients but also 
lobby governments to ensure that such legal opportunities exist (Palan et al., 2010; 
Shaxson, 2011). Tax dodging is gendered, since more taxes are paid by men than women 
while women are disproportionately beneficiaries of public expenditure (Browne, 2011; 
De Henau and Santos, 2011; Walby, 2011). The development of tax dodging devices by 
finance companies challenges the democratic will expressed in state policy and increases 
social inequalities.
Finance capital is often considered to be different from industrial capital, which is 
fixed in buildings and machines. However, this analytic distinction has become blurred 
in practice. The rise of ‘shareholder value’ has increased the extent to which competition 
between firms to make profits occurs on finance and capital markets rather than in more 
productive activities (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). This increases the incentive to 
financialize assets and to drive down the position of suppliers and workers (Baud and 
Durand, 2012). ‘Shareholder value helps to legitimize the predominance of shareholders 
over other stakeholders, and the predominance of a capital market view of the firm over 
an industrial one’ (Aglietta, 2000: 148). This new approach to company ownership shifts 
the focus to realizing value through buying, restructuring and selling companies rather 
than through long-term investment and incremental improvement of a specific company 
(Clark, 2009). These processes increase the proportion of profits derived from financial 
rather than industrial activities while blurring the boundary between industrial and finan-
cial capital (Krippner, 2011).
Finance is usually considered in relation to institutions and banks, but it is wider than 
this. The sphere of finance is extended by the financialization of everyday life (Martin, 
2002). Individual (consumer or household) investment products claim to redistribute 
money across the life-course from times when most income is earned to those when it is 
least earned and most needed. This includes mortgages to access housing (Young et al., 
2011), pensions to access income in old age (Blackburn, 2002), credit cards and other 
forms of consumer debt (Lapavitsas, 2011). These financial products are uneven in their 
class and gender effects; for example, women typically have access to loans under worse 
conditions than men, which means that they are more vulnerable to acquiring debts they 
have difficulty in repaying (Fishbein and Woodall, 2006). When the definition of finance 
is extended to include individual consumer products, many more individuals are seen to 
be incorporated into the web of financial interests.
Financial crises are one of several forms of instability generated by finance in the 
economy, with significant effects on wider society. Smaller forms of instability have 
been analysed as ‘business cycles’. In a ‘credit crunch’ banks cease to perform their 
usual function of lending money. In a ‘bubble’, asset prices rise and fall, benefiting 
those who invest during the upswing (the insiders) and disadvantage others (often 
outsiders). There is a sudden loss of value as finance is restructured; the losses being 
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borne unevenly. Crises are moments of redistribution of value. Bubbles sometimes 
leave a residue of productive investment (Perez, 2002). Financial crises often lead to 
recessions in the ‘real’ economy and to unemployment. A wide formulation of the 
concept of crisis is helpful in encompassing the effects on the ‘real’ economy of finan-
cial collapse, including economic recessions, governmental policy responses to the 
recessions, government budget deficits, currency crises and economic restructuring. 
The effects of recessions are unevenly experienced, with those already disadvantaged 
often bearing the larger costs. For example, the 2010 budget restructuring in the UK 
is gendered, as cuts in welfare state programmes disproportionately affect women 
(House of Commons Library, 2010; Walby, 2011; Young et al., 2011). This ‘instabil-
ity’ of capitalism is conceptualized by Schumpeter (1954) as ‘creative destruction’ 
through which old industries are destroyed when new more productive forms have 
been developed. Another approach views crises as potential critical turning points to 
a different kind of society. Rather than the effect of the crisis being temporary fol-
lowed by a return to business as usual (Crouch, 2011), it may be more profound 
(Robinson and Barrera, 2012); indeed crises can be opportunities for neoliberal 
restructuring (Klein, 2007). Financial crisis can be seen as a sign of the exhaustion of 
a regime of capital accumulation, heralding a shift in the capitalist hegemon (Arrighi, 
1994), or even the end of capitalism (Harvey, 2011; Hilferding, 1981 [1910]). The 
theorization of ‘financial crisis’ is thus an important part of the analysis of the rela-
tionship between finance and society.
Frameworks of analysis
Four major frameworks for the analysis of finance can be identified: orthodox econom-
ics, drawing on Adam Smith; political economy, drawing on Marx; heterodox, drawing 
on Keynes and Minsky; and societal, drawing on Polanyi. They differ along five major 
dimensions: whether finance is conceptualized as an object or a social relationship; 
whether finance is seen as neutral in its effects on the economy; whether the state can 
effectively regulate finance; whether civil society and other aspects of society are signifi-
cant; and whether the social system, of which finance is part, is assumed to return to 
equilibrium.
The orthodox framework draws on the heritage of Adam Smith (1986 [1776]), Hayek 
(2001 [1944]) and Friedman (2002 [1962]). Money is conceptualized as an object rather 
than as a social relationship. Finance (as money and investment) is either invisible or 
treated as neutral, with the implication that it is not important in shaping the economy. 
Money is treated as if it can and should be seen through, as if it has no impact on the rest 
of the economy, or society; the functioning of finance reflects the rest of the economy. 
Money is a superficial cover or veil over the processes that really matter and should be 
ignored to understand the economy properly. The important processes in the economy 
are the production of goods and their exchange at their value. For example, Friedman, 
despite being known as a ‘monetarist’, thought money should be treated as passive in the 
economy: ‘the central characteristic of the market technique of achieving coordination is 
fully displayed in the simple exchange economy that contains neither enterprises nor 
money’ (Friedman, 2002: 14).
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The notion that finance has no independently significant effects on the economy fur-
ther rests on the thesis that markets are efficient and effective, leading to the exchange of 
goods at their value. It is assumed that markets in finance neutrally distribute capital in a 
rational and efficient way to where it is most productive and profitable. Markets are con-
sidered self-equilibrating. Indeed, for Friedman (as for Hayek, 2001 [1944]), since 
finance flows through free markets, which are self-regulating, there is no need or good 
purpose served by state intervention: political freedom is considered to follow economic 
freedom.
More common than an explicit argument for the lack of effect of finance is an implicit 
assumption that it is neutral. The lack of significance of finance is implicit in the work of 
many sociological writers on capitalism and modern society (e.g. Giddens, 1984), in 
which analysis of the economy is centred on employment, in articulation with the wel-
fare state and occasionally with domestic care-work.
In summary, the orthodox framework conceptualizes money as an object rather than a 
social relationship; treats finance as superficial and unimportant; considers that finance 
self-balances through markets without state intervention; considers that freedom in soci-
ety is more likely when the state does not interfere; and assumes that the economic sys-
tem as a whole is self-regulating and self-equilibrating.
The second framework, political economy, draws on Marx (1959 [1894]) to offer an 
analysis of finance within a theory of a capitalist system. Finance is a distinctive form of 
capital that seeks profits from investments and is thereby understood as a social relation-
ship rather than as an object. For Marx, finance (or money) capital was one form of capi-
tal, alongside industrial and commercial capital. Only industrial capital is productive of 
value and surplus value since the value of commodities is determined by the amount of 
labour embedded in them. Changes in the mode (forces and relations) of production, in 
the regime of capital accumulation, drive wider changes in social formations. Capitalism 
is inherently unstable, with tendencies to produce more goods than there are wages to 
purchase them, producing regular crises of over-production of goods and services or 
under-consumption since workers do not have the money to buy them. Such crises have 
the potential to escalate, getting larger and more significant and, in the long term, to lead 
to system failure. Instability in the economy is understood as an intrinsic feature of a 
capitalist system (Brenner, 2006; Callinicos, 2010; Foster and Magdoff, 2009; Gamble, 
2009). This is a consequence of the difficulties in continuously maintaining capital accu-
mulation. There are variations within the framework as to the relationship between 
finance capital, industrial capital, the state and society.
There is debate as to the relations between finance and industrial capital. Hilferding 
(1981 [1910]) argues that there is a tendency for finance capital to come to dominate 
industrial capital, as part of the process of development of monopoly capital and of impe-
rialist systems. For Bukharin (1972 [1915]) and Lenin (1934 [1917]), the development of 
financial capital was a stage of capitalism in which imperial rivalries threatened world 
war. Immiseration leads to political activity that leads towards revolutionary politics. The 
future they foresaw was a choice between barbarism and socialism, though this moment 
could be endlessly deferred as a result of changes in production or in state repression.
The regulation school locates the process of capital accumulation within a more 
nuanced theory of institutions in society (Aglietta, 2000 [1979]; Grahal and Teague, 
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2000). This situates finance as one of the several institutions that make up a regime of 
capital accumulation. Variations in the form of state regulation of finance are sources of 
capitalism’s historical variability. In particular, the central bank plays an important role 
in (usually) ensuring financial stability. The relative importance of the regulation of 
finance varies, with more recent writings (Aglietta, 2000; Boyer, 2000) attaching greater 
importance to finance as compared with the wage relation than earlier writing (Aglietta, 
2000 [1979]).
A different set of relationships between finance capital, industrial capital and states is 
identified by Arrighi (1994). This approach draws on world-systems theory (Wallerstein, 
2000) to inflect Marx with the insights of Weber and Braudel on the significance of 
states, especially hegemons. Financialization occurs when a regime of capital accumula-
tion is exhausted, when no more profits are to be made using a particular combination of 
forces and relations of production, technology and social organization. For Arrighi, the 
next stage is not barbarism or socialism, but rather a new capitalist hegemon with a dif-
ferent regime of accumulation. Financialization is a signal that the leadership of the 
global capitalist economy is about to change.
In summary, the political economy framework conceptualizes finance as a social rela-
tionship rather than an object. The main driver of change is the regime of capital accu-
mulation. Finance has implications for the economy and society and has varied relations 
with industrial capital, the state, war and society more broadly; there is no assumption of 
a system returning to equilibrium. The strength of the political economy framework 
stems from situating finance within the context of a wider social system and its weakness 
from the extent to which forces other than capital are neglected.
The third framework, heterodox, draws on Keynes and Minsky. It conceptualizes 
finance as a social relationship rather than as an object. It treats finance as a component 
of the economy that is distinct from productive capital. Finance has destabilizing effects 
on the rest of the economy. These effects can be mitigated by the state.
Within this framework money, or finance, has important effects on the economy. 
Keynes (1936) demonstrated the significance of money for the social and economic sys-
tem in his general theory of employment, interest and money. Noting the significance of 
the balance between financial and industrial capital, Keynes argued that speculation had 
deleterious consequences for the economy if it became more important than productive 
capital:
Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But the position is 
serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation. When the capital 
development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to 
be ill-done. (Keynes, 1936: 103)
Minsky (2008 [1986]) develops this further, arguing that, while finance is a necessary 
part of capitalism, concerned with investment for profit, it is intrinsically destabilizing 
rather than self-balancing. Minsky differentiates between three forms of investment and 
profit-taking: hedging, where income is sufficient to cover interest payments as well as 
profits; speculative, where income is only partly sufficient; and Ponzi, where there is lit-
tle income and payments are only met by taking in new funds. While the first practice 
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appears consistent with stability, the second is less so and the third not at all. In periods 
of relative tranquility, investors take on increasing amounts of risk that is decreasingly 
covered from their routine revenues and increasingly dependent upon the investment 
generating profits; that is, they move from the first to the second then third models of 
investment. A crisis occurs when this process reaches a peak or tipping point when inves-
tors have to sell in order to meet their obligations, but at prices that are falling, thereby 
creating a downward spiral. The degree of instability of the economy is the consequence 
of shifts in the balance between these three financial practices. Finance entrepreneurs 
continually attempt to create new financial practices and, although they are constrained 
in this by the financial authorities of the state, for example central bankers and financial 
regulators, during periods of relative tranquillity they usually win this game (Minsky, 
2008 [1986]: 279). Whereas in simple commodity markets the self-interest of the pro-
ducers and consumers might lead to market equilibrium, this is not the case in relation to 
finance.
In a world with capitalist finance it is simply not true that the pursuit by each unit of its own 
self-interest will lead an economy to equilibrium. The self-interest of bankers, levered investors, 
and investment producers can lead the economy to inflationary expansions and unemployment-
creating contractions. Supply and demand analysis – in which market processes lead to an 
equilibrium – does not explain the behavior of a capitalist economy, for capitalist financial 
processes mean that the economy has endogenous destabilizing forces. Financial fragility, 
which is a prerequisite for financial instability, is, fundamentally, a result of internal market 
processes. (Minsky, 2008: 280)
Minsky draws on Keynes; but this is a different interpretation from that assimilated into 
mainstream neoclassical economics. Keynes understood the inter-connectedness of 
socio-economic institutions and the mechanisms that mean that capitalism is not a self-
balancing system. State intervention was needed to regulate the economy, to pump 
money into the economy to feed demand to prevent depression, to regulate flows of capi-
tal and to develop the financial architecture to stabilize the international financial system. 
The assimilation of Keynes into mainstream economics was, however, partial and selec-
tive; only those parts consistent with econometric modelling and its presumption that the 
system ultimately returns to equilibrium were included; while the institutional architec-
ture of finance that generates instability was left out of focus. So Keynes is simultane-
ously a major source of inspiration for the analysis of the relations between finance, 
economy and society and a disputed intellectual heritage.
For Minsky, capitalism is an inherently unstable economic system when financial 
institutions develop to trade in capital assets. The larger the scale of capital assets, the 
more likely is the development of monopolistic practices. The larger the development 
of innovative financial practices, the greater is the potential for instability. Minsky con-
siders that states can intervene and moderate this instability – Big Government and a 
Big Bank are needed for this intervention – for example through counter-cyclical spend-
ing and dampening the development of financial practices. Minsky does not theorize the 
circumstances under which this might occur, since he does not embed his theory of 
finance within a comprehensive theory of society. Others have discussed aspects of 
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these circumstances, including Krugman (2008), Soros (2008) and Heyes, Lewis and 
Clark (2012).
Keynes and Minsky analyse finance as a social relationship, as a social system, and 
demonstrate how it causes instability in the rest of the economy. Finance intrinsically 
generates instability rather than equilibrium in a capitalist economy, though this effect 
can be reduced by the state. The circumstances under which states are successful in such 
intervention are not specified within the theory.
The fourth framework draws on Polanyi (1957) to treat finance within a wider account 
of society. Polanyi addresses money as a social relationship rather than as an object. 
Changes in the social relations of money alter its relationship with economy and society. 
Polanyi includes an analysis of the state and civil society, thereby embedding finance in 
a theory of society. He offers a wide-ranging historical sociological account of changes 
in commoditization, its effects on society and the response of society to the effects of this 
commoditization.
Polanyi suggests that there is a tendency towards the commoditization of money 
(financialization), of land (environment, nature) and of labour (workers) in capitalism. 
However, money, land and labour are not really commodities and treating them as such 
undermines their effective maintenance. This tendency to commoditization is inherently 
self-destructive because of the instabilities associated with this process. For example, 
labour needs continuous income in order not to starve to death, but economic recession 
might mean that this income is not continuously available.
Capitalism only survives because civil society acts to protect these ‘fictitious com-
modities’ from the full effects of commoditization. Society responds with support, such 
as the provision of welfare. There is thus a ‘double movement’: on the one hand, the 
commoditization of money, land and labour leads towards their destruction; on the other 
hand, society responds so as to regulate markets in fictitious commodities in order to 
protect them. Unless restrained by ‘society’, capitalism will destroy itself. In this way 
Polanyi adds civil society as well as state to his theory of the relationship between 
economy and society.
Polanyi offers an account of financialization (the commoditization of money), crisis 
and social response within the same text. His book is a series of assertions and fragments 
of arguments that can be interpreted as weaving these elements into a theory of a social 
system. Polanyi’s text is open to more than one reading. An alternative reading of Polanyi’s 
text is that it is too fragmented to constitute a social theory and that it is merely an account 
of contingent events in which, at a particular moment in history, forces in civil society 
responded to ensure state support for workers facing destitution as a consequence of capi-
talist development. If this reading is followed, then his work has few implications for 
social theory. This reading is not adopted here. If Polanyi’s text is interpreted as social 
theory, then it can be positioned as challenging the tendencies to reductionism in tradi-
tional Marxism because it introduces the concept of civil society into a theory of economy 
and society. This reading is adopted by Burawoy (2003). In this way Polanyi can be 
understood as providing a comprehensive social theory that integrates an account of the 
instability of the financial and economic system and responses to it into a theory of soci-
ety. However, this reading of Polanyi reveals a weakness in its assumption that the social 
system is self-equilibrating, that there is an automatic response by civil society when the 
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processes of commodification of money, land and labour become too damaging. The 
instability of the financial system is met by feedback that restabilizes the system. Burawoy 
(2010) uses the phrase ‘Pollyanna Polanyi’ to describe this assumption of automatic 
response. This discussion of Polanyi illustrates the difficult issues involved in producing 
a theory of a social system without the assumption that it is self-equilibrating.
Towards a new model
A model of the relations between finance and society needs to address five issues: the 
conceptualization of finance; whether finance is neutral or has significant effects on the 
economy; the relationship between finance and the state; the relationship between 
finance and society; and whether the social system of which finance is part is assumed to 
return to equilibrium or not. The four frameworks differ in how they address each of 
these issues. Building on the discussion of the four frameworks, a new model of the rela-
tions between finance and society is constructed by putting together the best answers to 
each of these five issues.
Conceptualizing finance: finance is better conceptualized as a social relationship, as a 
social system, than as an object. The orthodox framework treats finance as an object, but 
the other three address it as a social relationship. Treating finance as a social relationship 
means the inner dynamics of finance can be exposed for analysis. This is most effectively 
established in the work of Minsky, drawing on Keynes. Financialized relations have been 
extending into a wider range of economic practices, from everyday life to tax avoidance. 
It is useful to adopt a wider range than Minsky, who was writing several years ago, in 
order to grasp the significance of current processes of financialization for economy and 
society. The concept of financial crisis also needs to be conceptualized broadly, going 
beyond banking crises to include economic recession and ensuing policies to restructure 
economies, if the effects of finance on society and the full range of social inequalities are 
to be fully captured.
Finance and the economy: finance is better conceptualized as a distinctive part of the 
economy rather than as neutral in its effects. The orthodox framework treats finance as 
neutral in its effects on the economy as a consequence of treating money as an object and 
markets as inevitably efficient. The other three frameworks correctly treat the relation-
ship between finance and the rest of the economy as dynamic. The political economy 
framework usually treats industrial capital as dominant, though there are exceptions to 
this. Minsky offers a fruitful way to understand the changing relations between financial 
and industrial capital as a consequence of shifts between three types of investment. The 
relations between financial and industrial capital are subject to tension and change rather 
than being a fixed hierarchy.
Finance and the state: the relationship between finance and the state is best conceptu-
alized as both important and contingent upon other forces. The state is not irrelevant to 
the effective working of finance, as suggested by the orthodox framework, but rather, as 
Keynes and Minsky argue, central to whether it has small or large destabilizing effects 
on the rest of the economy. The political economy framework tends to the view that capi-
tal captures the state for its own purposes, but there are significant internal debates as to 
the extent to which this occurs under different circumstances.
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Finance and society: the relationship between finance and society is best conceptual-
ized as contingent on democratic forces. The significance of finance for society depends 
upon the inter-relationship of all institutional domains, including economy, polity 
(including states), violence (including war) and civil society. The orthodox framework 
considers finance not to have effects on society unless the state interferes. The political 
economy and heterodox frameworks assume that there are indirect connections but these 
are left out of focus. The significance of violence is rarely noted in theories of finance, 
but has a small presence in political economy if and when state power over both taxation 
and war is noted. More important is the potential significance of civil society as a site of 
democratic forces that might lead to state regulation of finance, as suggested by Polanyi.
Social system: while finance is part of a wider social system, this system is not self-
balancing. The assumption of an automatic return to equilibrium is a problematic fea-
ture of both the orthodox and Polanyian frameworks. Both approach economic and 
social systems as self-equilibrating, in the sense that if an external force perturbs the 
system, then there will be a negative feedback loop that acts to bring the system back 
into equilibrium. The newer complexity approach to systems drops the assumption of 
necessary self-equilibration; instabilities, generated internally or externally, may lead to 
positive feedback loops that drive the system still further from equilibrium, potentially 
leading to a tipping point with major systemic changes and new paths of development 
(Walby, 2007, 2009).
Finance and democracy
The significance of finance for society depends upon the relationship between finance 
and democracy. Can the state regulate finance in the wider social interest, or do finance 
and its related political projects capture the state? The answer to this question lies at the 
heart of the differences between the four frameworks: for the orthodox, state action in 
relation to finance is only interference that makes matters worse not better for society; 
for political economy, capital is likely to capture the state, though not inevitably so; for 
the heterodox, state action is necessary to turn capital into the servant rather than master 
of society and considers such action to be possible though contingent; for Polanyi, soci-
etal response is necessary to contain the excesses of the commoditization of money and 
is likely to happen.
The analysis of the relations between finance and democracy is presented in three 
parts: first, whether there is a repertoire of technical actions through which finance could 
be regulated; second, the nature of the political projects and forces engaged with finance; 
and third, the balance of power between democratic forces and finance.
First is a consideration of technologies through which states could potentially regulate 
finance. These involve actions against either rogues or regimes. Actions against indi-
vidual rogues are intended to restrain individuals who might break laws. Actions against 
regimes (institutions and systems) may be understood either as the reform of malfunc-
tioning practices or, more significantly, as de-financialization, as reducing the size and 
significance of finance.
The regulation of individual rogues depends upon the enactment of laws to make 
certain activities illegal or establishment of codes of practice that render practices illicit. 
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The location of the boundary between legal and illegal activities varies over time and 
place and is determined variously by technical expertise, politics and power, as is the 
vigour and effectiveness with which these rules are policed (Conley, 2012; Dorn, 2010; 
Engelen et al., 2011). Rules include those concerning: theft and fraud; banking and finan-
cial markets; corporate governance; tax evasion; and government budgets.
The many proposals to regulate banking include: increasing the ratio of capital held 
to loans provided in the Basel regulations; quality of collateral; reducing the impact of 
individual bank failure on other financial institutions and the wider economy by proce-
dures for resolution, such as making banks smaller, so none is ‘too big to fail’; separating 
retail from investment (casino) banks to reduce risk to the public; and state guarantees 
for small accounts of individuals (Independent Commission on Banking, 2011; Krugman, 
2008; Stiglitz and the UN Commission of Financial Experts, 2010). The regulation of 
financial markets includes: slowing the volatility of speculation on stock markets by 
making it illegal to borrow (rather than buy) stocks in order to sell them short; determin-
ing which innovations in financial derivatives are allowed; requiring registration of 
exchanges of financial instruments so as to make them transparent and open to scrutiny; 
scrutiny by credit rating agencies; regulating new financial products such as mortgages, 
pensions and credit cards (Blackburn, 2002; Krippner, 2011; Turner, 2009); and reducing 
international trade imbalances (Wolf, 2009). There are different principles of engage-
ment from ‘taxing’ to ‘regulation’, to increasing the resilience of the system by increas-
ing its modularity, robustness and incentive structure (Alessandri and Haldane, 2009; 
Haldane, 2010; Haldane and May, 2011). The more substantial reforms, such as separat-
ing retail from casino banking, would reduce the reach and significance of finance.
Corporate governance and company law regulates: the conditions under which legal 
personhood can be attached to a collective entity such as a company; the limitation of 
liability for debts; conditionality over (gendered) governance structure and composition; 
the extent to which a company that is active in one jurisdiction can be registered in a dif-
ferent one for purposes of company law or taxation, with consequent variations in the 
fragmentation or concentration of accountability; the extent to which ‘private equity’ can 
operate; the existence of take-overs of companies through leveraged buyouts; and the 
extent to which ‘codes of practice’ produced by trade bodies are voluntary or compulsory 
(Armstrong and Walby, 2012; Clark, 2009; Shaxson, 2011). The most substantial reforms 
would prevent leveraged buyouts by private equity and would reintegrate company gov-
ernance so that a company is registered and taxed and governed in the same location in 
which it does its business.
The collection of taxes varies significantly. While tax evasion is illegal, most tax 
dodging appears to take the form of legal tax avoidance which can be affected by varia-
tions in the pressure to reduce tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions (Palan et al., 2010; 
Shaxson, 2011). While there is pressure to reduce tax avoidance and evasion through 
increasing co-operation, harmonization and transparency, this has had limited success 
(Dorn, 2012; Genschel and Schwartz, 2011), even though countries such as the UK have 
substantial control over many tax havens (Shaxson, 2011). Financial transactions are lit-
tle taxed – there is a proposal to tax international financial transactions (Tobin tax). The 
regulation of government budgets and deficits by national and international entities var-
ies in: the extent of and implementation of equality regulations (Conley, 2012; Young 
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et al., 2011); and the extent of surveillance and conditionality by EU and international 
financial bodies over countries seeking loans, which has implications for the extent of 
neoliberal restructuring of economic institutions, from welfare spending to collective 
bargaining arrangements (Krugman, 2008; Lapavitsas et al., 2012). The most substantial 
reforms would be the closure of tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions and the taxation of 
international financial transactions.
Regulation of finance is technically possible. There is a large repertoire of tools avail-
able to regulate finance, from criminal sanctions on rogues to both minor and major 
reforms of institutional regimes. The most substantial reforms would contribute to de-
financialization, by reducing the scale and reach of finance capital. These include: sepa-
rating retail and casino banking; making leveraged private equity buyouts illegal; 
reintegrating company governance so that governance and taxation are in the same coun-
try as a business; closing tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions; and taxing international 
financial transactions (Tobin tax).
The second question is whether these technical reforms are politically possible. This 
depends on the political forces and projects engaged with finance. A range of projects 
and complex political forces are active in the field of finance, both opposing and support-
ing its regulation. While there are links between financial and economic position and 
political projects, there is not a simple relationship between them, since how people 
perceive their interests is shaped by social processes and struggles. It is necessary to 
identify the projects in both immediate and broader form; to identify the political con-
stituencies involved in these projects and draw boundaries around them.
The projects associated with the interests of finance can be either narrowly or broadly 
identified. In the narrow sense, there are public relations staff and lobbyists connected 
with finance companies that seek to influence legislation and codes of practice. Finance 
companies have lobbied against the regulation of their trade, as documented by Tett 
(2009). Attempts to reduce the secrecy of tax havens that allows for tax evasion and 
avoidance are contested by finance companies in the interests of their rich clients (Palan 
et al., 2010). The City of London Corporation, an association working in the ‘square 
mile’ of London where many finance companies have their headquarters, is well funded 
in order to represent the interests of these firms to government and elsewhere (Shaxson, 
2011). There has been resistance to attempts to reform and restructure financial practices, 
with representations to the press and political committees (Morgan, 2010), while the 
entity established to run the nationalized banks (UK Financial Investments) was set up at 
arm’s length from democracy, with City personnel and principles of action (Engelen 
et al., 2011). In a broader perspective, finance is often aligned with a project that can be 
variously described as promoting deregulation, market fundamentalism, or neoliberal-
ism (Greenspan, 2008; Harvey, 2005; Soros, 2008). The neoliberal project has grown in 
ascendancy, becoming a governmental programme and embedded in social formations. 
It has captured think tanks, political parties, states and international financial institutions. 
It has challenged the basis of alternative political projects, attacking trade unions, wel-
fare states and reducing the depth of democracy (Harvey, 2005; Walby, 2009). It has 
become sedimented in parties of the centre-left as well as of the right.
Projects seeking the regulation of finance can also be narrowly or broadly defined. In 
the narrow sense there are organizations seeking to reduce tax dodging, ranging from 
502 Work, employment and society 27(3)
NGOs such as UK Uncut to expert networks such as the Tax Justice Network. There are 
organizations that seek to make visible the unequal impacts of the neoliberal restructur-
ing of the state following post-crisis attempts to reduce the budget deficit, such as the 
TUC, False Economy and the Women’s Budget Group (Conley, 2012). The UN 
Commission headed by Stiglitz to report on a proposed new global financial architecture 
suggested that all those who might suffer the consequences of financial failure should 
share in the governance of financial institutions (Stiglitz and the UN Commission of 
Financial Experts, 2010). In the broader sense, there is a social democratic project, sup-
ported by trade union, labour, feminist and environmental organizations, which is posi-
tioned to support the regulation of finance. These coalitions increasingly include a gender 
component in the analysis, as the gender composition of trade unions and social demo-
cratic projects shifts (Walby, 2011). However, analysts of social democracy rarely dis-
cuss finance as one of its targets (Cram and Diamond, 2012).
The third issue is to locate these projects and forces within the wider social system in 
order to analyse the balance of power between democracy and finance.
There is a historical precedent in the regulation of capital by the state in the Bretton 
Woods institutional system set up after the Great Crash caused by finance capital in 
1929. Following the Great Crash of 1929, the ensuing Great Depression, the rise of fas-
cism and World War 2, social democratic forces emerged triumphant to enforce their 
claim to regulate capitalism, including finance, for the good of society as a whole. The 
post-war settlement, the compromise between capital and labour, included strong regula-
tions on finance capital. It led to an unprecedented 30 years of economic growth, increas-
ing prosperity, increasing state welfare provision, the partial transformation of the gender 
regime and reducing class and gender inequalities.
The post-war social democratic project drew on a constituency based in trade unions 
rooted in skilled manual work in an industrial era of mass production. However, the for-
ward march of labour halted, partly as a result of changes in industrial structure that 
supported these political projects and partly as a result of the rise of the neoliberal project 
to contest it. However, there is a new basis for social democracy in the transformation of 
the gender regime and the institutionalization of feminism in civil society, including 
trade unions (where women are now half the members) and in the state, where women 
are increasingly represented in parliament and in the gender equality policy architecture. 
It is this gendered social democratic project that the current gendered neoliberal project 
contests. The contestation over public expenditure concerns jobs that are disproportion-
ately held by women (in the public services), services (health, education, care-services) 
that are disproportionately used by women and disproportionately politically supported 
by women (Walby, 2011).
Ascertaining the nature and balance of current political forces associated with these 
projects for and against regulating finance capital is difficult. The Occupy movement sug-
gests that it is 1 per cent against 99 per cent. However, while it is possible to make some 
distinctions between the various constituencies and projects concerning the regulation of 
finance, there are challenges to identifying a simple division between the beneficiaries 
and the losers of finance. The process of financialization has implications for the nature of 
the constituencies engaged in political processes, in some instances blurring boundaries 
between what might have been distinct categories of supporters and opponents of finance 
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capital and its political projects. The financialization of industrial capital reduced the dis-
tinction between financial and industrial fractions of capital, while at the same time 
increasing the power of finance. The financialization of everyday life increases the 
involvement of many individuals in the web of interests of finance, as the range of finan-
cial products is extended to a wider range of consumers. For example the development of 
mortgaged housing and the sale of council houses gave some households an interest in 
rising house prices, though this was not in the interests of all. The development of pen-
sions entwines workers and pensioners with finance capital. As Aglietta (2000: 147) asks: 
‘What is the meaning of, and what are the prospects for, a stage of capitalism whereby 
pooled savings of labour, whose investment is delegated to professional managers, 
become the paramount shareholder?’ The process of blurring of the boundaries between 
those who are exploited by finance and those who are its beneficiaries is not unique to 
finance capital, since wage labourers exploited by capitalist employers simultaneously 
may benefit in the form of higher wages from the success of their employer. Nevertheless, 
financialization has significant consequences for the constituencies that might otherwise 
have supported political projects seeking to regulate finance capital.
The relationship between finance and the state depends on whether states are demo-
cratic or captured by finance. Both outcomes are possible. In the UK social democratic 
period between 1945 and 1975, which followed a period of turbulence in the financial 
crash of 1929, fascism, holocaust, war and reconstruction, there was a significant regula-
tion of finance in the interests of the wider economy and society. This was a period of 
unprecedented financial, economic and social stability; economic growth and develop-
ment; increased democratization; reduced violence and warfare; increasing personal 
freedoms; and decreasing inequalities of many kinds. It was a period in which the bal-
ance of political forces was in favour of the regulation of finance. This social democratic 
regulation of finance was challenged by the development of the neoliberal project, with 
its market fundamentalism, deregulation and attacks on alternative projects in trade 
unions, collective bargaining, welfare states and social democracy. As financialization 
developed, extending into everyday life through mortgages, pensions and credit cards 
and into industrial capital through fragmentation of company forms and shareholder 
value, finance capital increased its power through the associated political project of neo-
liberalism. The neoliberal project captured many political parties, states and international 
financial institutions, spreading as a global wave around the world, becoming embedded 
in governmental programmes and social formations. However, there remain significant 
variations in the extent to which neoliberal projects are dominant in governmental pro-
grammes and social formations; as well as some significant outposts of alternative think-
ing and practice.
The discussion of the practicalities and practice of regulation of finance by the state has 
implications for the four frameworks of analysis. The orthodox framework, which treats 
money as an object and markets as efficient, conceives of little purpose in regulating 
finance, except to prevent fraud. The political economy framework sees good reason to 
regulate finance, but little prospect that this will occur within capitalism, given the power 
of finance capital over state and society. The heterodox framework considers that regula-
tion of finance by the state is necessary for the effective working of economy and society 
and that it is possible. Polanyi suggests that regulation of finance is necessary to protect 
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society and likely to happen when the double movement of civil society responds to 
excessive marketization thereby re-embedding the economy in society. The conclusion 
drawn here is that the regulation of finance by democratic forces focused on the state is 
necessary for an effective economy, is technically possible and is supported by a range of 
projects and forces, but that opposition is strong and the outcome is not yet resolved.
Conclusion
The new framework for the analysis of finance in society constructed here draws on the 
best elements from the four major existing frameworks – orthodox, political economy, 
heterodox and societal. This includes: the conceptualization of finance; the relationship 
between finance, the economy, the state, violence and civil society; and the nature of the 
social system as a whole.
Finance should be conceptualized as a social relationship, as a social system, rather 
than as an object, as is argued in all frameworks except the orthodox. Finance is a form 
of profit-seeking and a form of capital, as noted by the political economy framework. 
The distinction and relationship between the three stages of investment identified by 
Minsky, building on the work of Keynes, identifies the nature of the financial system that 
is simultaneously a necessary part of capitalism and a source of its instabilities, ranging 
from minor bubbles to major crises. Finance is a site of power struggles at the heart of 
capitalism, between the producers of goods (capital and labour) and producers of money 
(central and private banks and financial institutions); this challenges the notion that 
exploitation takes place primarily at the point of production. The significance of finance 
grows as processes of financialization spread its influence through economy and society. 
States can regulate finance so as to mitigate these instabilities, but the extent to which 
this occurs depends on wider social processes. After the Great Crash of 1929 and its 
consequent Depression and War, the social democratic project regulated and restricted 
the scale of finance. The rise of the neoliberal project and its embedding in governmental 
programmes and social formations has reduced these controls, so that finance capital is 
again destabilizing the economy. There is a repertoire of technical processes that could 
contribute to de-financialization, by reducing the scale and reach of finance capital, 
including: separating retail and casino banking; making leveraged private equity buyouts 
illegal; reintegrating company governance so that governance and taxation are in the 
same country as a business; closing tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions; and taxing 
international financial transactions (Tobin tax). The mobilization of democratic princi-
ples embedded in contemporary state and civil society makes it possible for the state to 
control finance. However, de-financialization depends on the balance of political forces. 
The neoliberal project is well entrenched and processes of financialization have brought 
many into the web of financial interests, affecting the constituencies that might have sup-
ported state regulation. The notion of a self-equilibrating social system, suggested by 
Polanyi, in which society inevitably protects itself, is unrealistic. The outcome is unclear.
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